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Monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA) has earned the nickname
‘‘warrior gene’’ because it has been linked to aggression in obser-
vational and survey-based studies. However, no controlled exper-
imental studies have tested whether the warrior gene actually
drives behavioral manifestations of these tendencies. We report an
experiment, synthesizing work in psychology and behavioral eco-
nomics, which demonstrates that aggression occurs with greater
intensity and frequency as provocation is experimentally manip-
ulated upwards, especially among low activity MAOA (MAOA-L)
subjects. In this study, subjects paid to punish those they believed
had taken money from them by administering varying amounts of
unpleasantly hot (spicy) sauce to their opponent. There is some
evidence of a main effect for genotype and some evidence for a
gene by environment interaction, such that MAOA is less associ-
ated with the occurrence of aggression in a low provocation
condition, but significantly predicts such behavior in a high prov-
ocation situation. This new evidence for genetic influences on
aggression and punishment behavior complicates characteriza-
tions of humans as ‘‘altruistic’’ punishers and supports theories of
cooperation that propose mixed strategies in the population. It
also suggests important implications for the role of individual
variance in genetic factors contributing to everyday behaviors and
decisions.
warrior gene  genetics  punishment  power-to-take game 
hot sauce paradigm
One of the common assumptions of rational choice theory isthat individuals are purely self-interested utility maximizers.
However, research in economics and other social sciences has found
that individual preferences can also include other-regarding factors,
such as altruism, status, and fairness. In addition, individuals are
often willing to incur nontrivial costs to influence others’ behavior,
even when such behavior can confer no direct or strategic personal
benefit. In particular, humans readily try to harm others who have
hurt them or their group, despite the fact that such behavior may
not generate any future individual benefit (1). Because in many
cases those who punish do not end up better off overall, it remains
a puzzle as to why such behavior survives if it does not improve
prospects for cooperation (2, 3). An additional puzzle arises in the
face of cross-cultural data suggesting that individuals in some
societies do not engage in costly punishment as much as those in
Western industrialized societies (4, 5).
Although it varies somewhat across societies, real life coopera-
tion and punishment behavior does not always follow the predic-
tions of rational choice theory (4, 6). Various models have tried to
address the reasons for this discrepancy (7–11). Here, we suggest a
possible genetic source of individual variation in this behavior. This
is the first study to investigate a genetic basis for punishment and
the first to provide some evidence for a gene-environment inter-
action in the context of a behavioral economics experiment. Our
results support previous work using financial incentives, which
indicates that the experimental punishment literature may in fact
reflect a broad based tendency to punish.
In this study, we examine conditions under which individuals pay
money to cause physical pain to others who have takenmoney from
them in a previous interaction. This study not only replicates
previous experimental work demonstrating a willingness to engage
in costly punishment, but also tests the influence of themonoamine
oxidase A (MAOA) gene, which has been linked to aggression.
We draw on two separate but overlapping literatures: One from
behavioral genetics, examining the effect of a genetic polymor-
phism on propensity for aggression; and a second from economics,
addressing an individual’s willingness to pay to punish others. In so
doing, we combine a behavioral measure of aggression from
psychology with a clear and simple economic game to investigate
the conditions under which people will aggress against others
despite incurring a financial cost to themselves. Previous literature
suggests that one of those conditions may be individual variability
in genetic alleles, such that individuals with a low activity form of
the gene that encodes monoamine oxidase A (MAOA-L) will be
more likely to react with aggression to challenge (12). Recent
work in behavioral genetics has stressed the importance of inter-
actions between genetic predispositions and environmental con-
tingencies (13).
We build on an emerging literature examining genetic influences
within experimental economics, including twin studies demonstrat-
ing the influence of heritability in trust game (14) and ultimatum
game play (15) among a sample of both American and Swedish
subjects. Although there is mounting evidence that behavior in
experimental economic games has a heritable component, implying
an influence from some unidentified part of the whole genome,
there have been few studies explicitly testing for a relationship
between economic behavior and a single gene. One recent exper-
imental study suggests a link between a common human polymor-
phism in vasopressin (AVPR1a RS3) and monetary allocations in
a Dictator Game (16), but there have not been any studies of genes
related to aggression in such games, and none of this previous work
has looked for a link between genetic and environmental interac-
tions. Ours is the first study to look at any gene explicitly in
two-player interactions, and the first to examine genetic correlates
of behavioral punishment. We conduct this test examining the role
ofMAOA in aggressive behavior toward others in the context of an
economic power-to-take game.
The MAOA gene codes for the enzyme monoamine oxidase A
that plays a key role in the catabolism of neurotransmitters,
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including dopamine, norepinphrine, and serotonin (12, 17). Earlier
studies found that mice with MAOA knockouts were more aggres-
sive than their normal counterparts ormice withMAOBknockouts
(which regulates different neurotransmitters) (17). A Dutch family
with a repeated incidence of violent criminal behavior amongmales
across several generations was also found to have an abnormality in
MAOA (a missense mutation of a single nucleotide of the gene)
(18). Recent imaging work in a large sample demonstrates that
during emotional arousal, MAOA-Lmen show greater reactivity in
the amygdala and lower activity in the regulatory prefrontal areas.
Such work suggests the emotional and cognitive channels that link
MAOA-L to impulsive forms of aggression (12, 19).
Among humans, a functional polymorphism in the MAOA gene
can mediate the impact of traumatic early life events on the
propensity to engage in violence as an adult. Specifically, children
who had suffered abuse and who had the low activity form of
MAOA were much more likely to develop antisocial problems as
adults (20, 21). Later studies replicated the risk of low activity
MAOA, in combination with traumatic early life events, for both
psychiatric patients and healthy adults’ predispositions toward
physical aggression (22). A major gap in the literature remains,
however, in that it is unclear whether self-report measures of
aggression actually reflect behavioral aggression (i.e., actions rather
than words).
We combine this work with a second literature drawn from
economics. Our experiment also taps into the growing literature on
punishment behavior, in which subjects voluntarily incur costs to
punish others. A key result from experimental economics is that
even where individuals are not the beneficiary of any postpunish-
ment change in behavior (because partners are anonymous and
never meet again in subsequent rounds), they often pay to punish
those who violate social norms such as cooperation or reciprocity
(23–27). However, the link between punishment and aggression is
not always clear. Fehr and Gachter’s famous experiment included
post game self-reports, which suggested that punishers were moti-
vated by anger at free-riders (1). Later replication demonstrated
this same association between anger and punishment where free-
riding was not allowed. This link was exacerbated with the increas-
ing presence of monetary inequality. These findings indicate that
the motivation to punish others may not derive simply from the
desire to punish free-riders but also (or instead) from egalitarian
motives (26). This literature in economics has not, however, exam-
ined whether individuals would be willing to harm someone phys-
ically in response to economic harm. Therefore, it seems important
to examine the underlying causes of aggression and punishment—in
themselves—given that they appear to be linked even in widely
different social scenarios. Our experiment aims to do this, by
examining a genetic proclivity for engaging in costly aggressive
behavior in the context of environmental provocation. In short, we
deploy hypotheses from behavioral genetics, by using a psycholog-
ical paradigm, to address an economic puzzle. In this way, we seek
to test the extent to which these differences relate to variance in
MAOA allele expression.
Methods Primer. In 2008 we collected genetic samples from 78male
subjects, who were assigned to 2 groups: those carrying the high
activity (MAOA-H) or low activity (MAOA-L) allele (SI Text
Section S1 and Table S1). Women were excluded because of the
difficulty of assigning levels of MAOA enzymatic activity in het-
erozygous females and to minimize potential confounding factors.
We used the ‘‘hot sauce’’ paradigm (28) from the psychological
literature, in which subjects have the opportunity to administer
unpleasantly hot (spicy) sauce to an opponent who is known to not
like its taste. How much hot sauce the subject administers consti-
tutes the behavioral measure of their aggression (SI Text Section
S2). The punishment elicitation experiment comprised 4 rounds
and had a structure similar to a ‘‘power-to-take’’ game (29, 30) (SI
Text Section S3). In each round, subjects had an experimentally
manipulated portion of their earnings from a vocabulary task
stripped by an anonymous — and unknown to them, fictional —
person. Subjects then were given the opportunity to punish this
player through the forced administration of hot sauce.
The exact procedure was repeated for 3 subsequent rounds with
a (purportedly) new partner each time. Subjects were told that in
each round they would have a new supply of hot sauce that they
could either administer to their partner or trade in formoney. After
the experiment, subjects were fully debriefed.
We focus on an individual’s willingness to pay to harm someone
who had just takenmoney from them (money that they had worked
to earn). The experiment manipulated the amount taken at two
levels: 80% and 20%. We label the 80% decision a ‘‘high take’’
outcome and the 20% decision ‘‘low take’’. We hypothesized that
subjects who had 80% taken from them would be more likely to
administer hot sauce, and administermore of it, than thosewho had
only 20% taken.
Further, if MAOA has an effect on behavior, we predict that it
will depend on the nature of the stimulus. From previous brain
imaging work demonstrating greater sensitivity to social rejection
among MAOA-L types (31), we hypothesized that MAOA-L
subjects should behave no differently than other subjects with low
takes, because this represents little provocation to the individual
irrespective of genotype. Conversely, MAOA-L subjects are pre-
dicted to respond more aggressively than MAOA-H subjects when
80% is taken. Thus, subjects with MAOA-L were hypothesized to
behave more aggressively, but only when significantly provoked
(i.e., a gene by environment interaction).
Results
Our analysis drops 8 subjects that in a postexperiment survey
expressed disbelief in whether they were actually forcing other
subjects to eat hot sauce [although our results change little whether
we include these subjects or not (SI Text Section S5 and Table S2)].
We find clear support for our initial hypothesis that high take
subjects behave in an aggressive manner toward their opponent
more frequently, and with greater intensity, than low take ones.
Because our design randomized the amount taken in each round,
approximately half the people in each round had 80% of their
earnings taken whereas the other half had 20% taken. Because of
the nonnormal distributions of our data we useWilcoxon rank-sum
tests. We also report one-tailed test statistics in keeping with our
directional hypotheses. Pooling across all 4 rounds of the experi-
ment, subjects demonstrated higher levels of behavioral aggression
when 80% was taken than when 20% was taken (n  292, Z 
6.16, P  0.001, Fig. 1). A test of proportions also revealed that
subjects were more likely to try to harm their adversary by some
amount (rather than nothing) when 80%was taken than 20% (66%
versus 39%, n  292, Z  4.70, P  0.001). We also observed
highly significant differences in the same direction when analyzing
each of the rounds separately and when we include observations
only of the first time someone experienced 20% or 80% taken from
them (SI Text Section S6).
Furthermore, a battery of emotional surveys administered after
the first round showed that those having 80% taken were more
likely to report being ‘mad’ and ‘angry’ than those who had 20%
taken (SI Text Section S7).
For our subsequent hypotheses we divide subjects by MAOA
genotype. Fig. 2 pools observations across rounds and shows a
significant difference between MAOA types when 80% was taken
(n 139,Z 2.33,P 0.01) but nodifferencewhen 20%was taken
(n  141, Z  .87, P  0.19). The proportion of observations in
which subjects meted out any aggression (rather than none) when
80% was taken was also higher among MAOA-L types (75%)
versusMAOA-H types (62%) (n 139, Z 1.40, P 0.08).When
20% was taken there was no difference between MAOA types
(40% versus 34%, n 141, Z .71, P 0.24). Ignoring the amount
taken, MAOA-L types had higher levels of aggression (n  280,
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Z  1.98, P  0.05). This suggests that the influence of genetic
differences may be moderated by the environmental stimulus, in
this case the amount taken.
Because our subjects participated in the task several times, in the
next part of the analysis we (a) check for interference across rounds
(e.g., did those who received the 80% treatment in round 1 behave
differently in round 2 from those who received the 20% treat-
ment?), and (b) analyze each round separately. First, although we
did not observe any significant interference between rounds (SI
Text Section S8), we also compare behavior acrossMAOA types for
the first time someone had 80% taken and the first time someone
had 20% taken (to eliminate any confound or noise arising from
past experience). MAOA-L subjects were slightly more likely to be
aggressive the first time 20%was taken (n 67, Z 1.39,P 0.08),
but we see a larger, and significant, difference across MAOA types
when 80%was taken (n 66, Z 1.85, P 0.032; see Fig. 3). This
suggests a main effect influence of MAOA but this effect is
moderated by the environmental stimulus (take amount). Further-
more, if we ignore the amount taken, but directly incorporate the
repeated measure nature of our design (using a repeated measure
ANOVA), we find amain effect forMAOA (SI Text Section S9 and
Fig. S1).
Second, we considered each round separately (Fig. 4). In round
1 there was a significant difference between high and low MAOA
types among those who had 80% taken (n  33, Z  3.09, P 
0.001), whereas there was no discernible difference in genetic types
between those who had 20% taken (n  37, Z  .58, P  0.28).
Rounds 2 and 3 show no statistical difference and round 4 shows a
slight difference (see Fig. 4 legend for full statistics).
In our experiment we bounded the amount of hot sauce that
someone could use to try to hurt their partner. In reality, subjects
may have wished to give up more points and behave even more
aggressively toward their partner with a larger amount of hot sauce.
Thus, our data are artificially censored from above by our exper-
imental design.
To address this we compare the proportion of observations that
administered the maximal amount by MAOA and experimental
treatment (i.e., subjects that used all possible $3 to punish). When
80% was taken, 44% of observations fromMAOA-L administered
the maximal amount of hot sauce, whereas only 19% of observa-
tions fromMAOA-H types did (n 139, Z 2.95,P 0.01).When
subjects had 20% taken from them, 12% of observations from
MAOA-L types and 6% from MAO-H types administered the
maximal amount (n  141, Z  1.31, P  0.1). We obtain similar
results if we look at the first time someone had 80% or 20% taken.
We also obtain similar results if we examine rates of aggression
depending on whether more or less than half the amount of hot
sauce was assigned. The message from this exercise is that com-
paring those who administered the highest amount of hot sauce to
those who administered less than this amount reveals the same
patterns as our other analyses above.
Finally, Table 1 reports results from a tobit regression model to
account for this censoring. Our dependent variable is the amount
of behavioral aggression.We include a dummy variable for whether
80%was taken (80%Take), a variable equal to one if the subject had
the low activity form of the gene (MAOA-L), and an interaction
between these variables (MAOA-L 80%Take). In the results that
follow, we estimate models for each round separately, and when
pooling all observations. In the first round the interaction term is
positive and highly significant (t 3.51, P 0.001). For the second
round the interaction term is negative (t  1.39, P  0.085)
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Fig. 1. Amount of hot sauce subjects chose to administer (our measure of
aggression) after having 20% (gray bars) or 80% (black bars) of theirwinnings
takenby their (supposed) interactionpartner.Wilcoxon ranksumtest:n292,
Z  6.16, P  0.001.
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Fig. 2. Amount of hot sauce administered by high activity MAOA subjects (gray bars) and low activity MAOA subjects (black bars), after having 20% (Left; n
141, Z  .865, P  0.19) or 80% (Right; n  139, Z  2.33, P  0.01) of their winnings taken by their (supposed) interaction partner.
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whereas it is positive in the third (t  1.14, P  0.12) and fourth
(t  .87, P  0.19) rounds. Recall that round 1 offers the best test
of these relationships, because the first reactions remain uncon-
taminated by any other possible effects as the experiment proceeds.
When we pool observations the interaction term is positive and
approaches statistical significance at the .05 level (t  1.37, P 
0.08). Incorporating the censoring created by our design, we see that
aggression is generally increasing in the interaction between
MAOA type and amount taken and this ismost apparent in the first
round.
Discussion
In this study, we applied a behavioral measure of aggression—the
willingness of subjects to pay to administer hot sauce to someone
they believed had taken money from them—within the context of
a simple economic power-to-take game.We take their allocation of
hot sauce to their opponent as a behavioral measure of aggression
in reaction to the challenge of having money taken from them.
Because of previous genotyping of subjects, we were able to
investigate the relationship between genetic variance in our subject
population and their willingness to engage in physical aggression
toward another.
Subjects who had 80% of their money taken were more likely to
aggress against the person responsible for their loss, and proved
significantly more likely to administer hot sauce, and more of it, to
their purported opponent than those who had 20% of their money
taken.We also find evidence for a gene by environment interaction,
such that individuals with the low activity form of MAOA proved
more likely to administer hot sauce to their opponent when 80% of
their earnings were taken than those with the more active version
of the gene. There were lower differences between genetic groups
when only 20% of subjects’ money was taken, demonstrating an
interaction between the degree of threat or challenge and aggres-
sive response. We note, however, that overall smaller punishment
rates when 20%was taken and our smaller proportion ofMAOA-L
subjects mean that our statistical tests in this treatment have lower
power. For present purposes we felt it better to probe both a main
effect difference and an interactive effect by varying the take
amount. Experimentalists with similar research interests as ours
might consider designs using collected genetic information and
treatment assignment probabilities that optimize efficiency and
power, especially in experiments including treatments with low
hypothesized effect sizes. This can be of particular importance for
studies of MAOA given that the low activity form is carried by only
1/3 of the population inWestern societies (32). Future studies that
vary the size of the affront in a more fine grained manner (not just
20% or 80%)might also better calibrate the functional relationship
between provocation and aggression across genetic populations,
and better test hypotheses about the gene-environment interaction
we consider.
This behavioral demonstration of the impact of MAOA-L on
aggression documents its activity beyond previous survey results.
Specifically, it expands on previous work in behavioral genetics
which found a relationship between MAOA-L and self-reported
aggression (20–22) by providing a clear demonstration of the
relationship between MAOA-L and actual behavioral aggression
(and in controlled experimental conditions). In so doing, this
experiment suggests a potential genetic contribution to the findings
from behavioral economics demonstrating individuals’ willingness
to pay to behave aggressively toward their opponent (23, 26, 27).
Although our results suggest MAOA plays a role in aggression,
a major question remains as to how and why individual genetic
differences cause different behavioral outcomes. In other words,
what might be the underlying psychological phenomena at work? In
a previous study, Eisenberger et al. showed how MAOA related to
a negative socio-emotional experience (31). Although MAOA-L
individuals are more aggressive, the psychological mechanisms by
which this occurs have been unclear. They may be more aggressive
because they are hyposensitive, and care less about harming others,
or because they are hypersensitive and overreact. Eisenberger et al.’s
research examined the relationship between MAOA and trait
forms of both aggression and interpersonal hypersensitivity, and
neural responses in brain areas associated with rejection-related
distress. They found that individuals with MAOA-L demonstrated
higher trait aggression and higher trait interpersonal hypersensi-
tivity than those with MAOA-H. In addition, such MAOA-L
individuals showed greater activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (dACC), an area that has been associated with distress
related to rejection or status challenges. Because the relationship
between MAOA and aggression was mediated by the dACC
activity, the authors suggest that MAOAmight produce aggression
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Fig. 3. Amountofhot sauceadministeredbyhighactivityMAOAsubjects (graybars) and lowactivityMAOAsubjects (blackbars), thefirst time theyexperienced
having 20% (Left; n 67, Z 1.39, P 0.081) or the first time they experienced having 80% (Right; n 66, Z 1.85, P 0.032) of their winnings taken by their
(supposed) interaction partner.
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through heightened, rather than reduced, sensitivity to social
rejection.
Our findings confirm a role for MAOA genotype in response to
provocation, and in particular extend this link to aggressive behav-
ior in response to financial loss. The demonstration of a gene-
environment interaction also helps establish the importance of
examining genetic variance within particular ecologically valid
contexts. Replication across additional populations and within
diverse environmental contexts now appears warranted.
A final remaining question involves the evolutionary implica-
tions of these results. Subjects proved willing to incur private
financial cost to punish others in an actual physical way, even
when such actions did not provide any return on their invest-
ment. This suggests that a primary puzzle of human economic
behavior is ‘‘spite’’ (behavior that is costly to self and others), not
‘‘altruistic punishment’’ (costly to self but beneficial to others)
(33). Indeed, recent behavioral games suggest that, since spite is
costly, winners do not punish (2). Although spite has been the
‘‘neglected ugly sister of altruism’’ (34), there is good reason to
expect it may have played a significant role in the evolution of
social behavior.
The influence of genotypic variation among individuals also
complicates the notion that humans are ‘‘altruistic’’ punishers
because it raises questions about whether one behavioral strat-
Fig. 4. Amount of hot sauce administered by high activity MAOA subjects (gray bars) and low activity MAOA subjects (black bars) for each of the 4 rounds of
the experiment (A–D). Each round had subjects who faced the 20% take treatment (Left), or faced the 80% take (Right). Wilcoxon tests of aggression byMAOA
type: Round 1: 20% (n 37, Z .58, P 0.28), 80% (n 33, Z 3.09, P 0.001); Round 2: 20% (n 40, Z 1.03, P 0.153), 80% (n 30, Z -.35, P 0.637);
Round 3: 20% (n  32, Z  -.66, P  0.746), 80% (n  38, Z  .81, P  0.2); Round 4: 20% (n  32, Z  .23, P  0.41) 80% (n  38, Z  1.45, P  0.073).
Table 1. Effect of MAO-L and take interaction
Rnd1 Rnd2 Rnd3 Rnd4 AllRnds
80%Take 2.315 [1.005] 3.291 [1.177] 3.620 [1.050] 3.151 [1.312] 3.101 [0.583]
MAOA-L 0.833 [1.231] 2.249 [1.503] 0.746 [1.589] 1.004 [1.773] 0.978 [0.775]
MAOA-L  80%Take 8.922 [2.544] 3.086 [2.227] 2.372 [2.081] 2.250 [2.585] 1.567 [1.140]
Constant 1.341 [0.729] 1.297 [0.745] 0.889 [0.745] 1.481 [0.985] 1.247 [0.412]
Sigma constant 3.563 [0.340] 4.067 [0.395] 3.716 [0.360] 4.594 [0.462] 4.124 [0.202]
Observations 70 70 70 70 280
Tobit regression for each roundof the experiment andpooling across all rounds. Dependent variable: punishment amount (censoring
at 10). SE in brackets.
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egy is really common to a majority of people. Models of the
evolution of cooperation might usefully be revisited with this in
mind, especially because recent game theoretic treatments find
that punishment may evolve in some subsections of the popu-
lation but not others (raising the possibility of frequency depen-
dence or mixed strategies) (8). Our study suggests that there may
be genetic bases for such a hypothesis. Indeed, our results beg the
question of why the MAOA-L allele has been maintained in the
population [typically 1/3 in western populations, although ap-
proaching 2/3 are reported in Maori populations (32)] if it
promotes aggressive behavior. There is some evidence of an
underlying positive selection sweep in human population struc-
tures in some areas (32). One possibility for why MAOA-L has
not become universal lies in frequency dependent selection; if
everyone were MAOA-L, its advantages would disappear. If
everyone were MAOA-H, there may be a niche for more
aggressive individuals to exploit (8). Another possibility is that
genetic variation is preserved because it is linked to other genes
or has a mix of positive and negative characteristics. Finally,
genetic differences in aggression may be an example of the
adaptive logic of ‘‘moralistic aggression’’ in promoting effective
reciprocal bargaining or cooperative relationships (35, 36). All of
these hypotheses are ripe for investigation.
Methods
Genotype frequencies among our group of college subjects (27% MAOA-L)
did not significantly deviate from those reported from other western popu-
lations (20, 22) (SI Text Section S1). Basic demographic breakdowns are given
in SI Text Section S10.
We asked subjects whether they wanted to first try the hot sauce them-
selves. We inquired as to whether subjects tasted and liked the hot sauce.
There was no significant difference in behavior based on those who liked and
did not like hot sauce (SI Text Section S11).
In each round, subjects were told they were being paired up with an
anonymous person in a separate laboratory located across campus but con-
nected through the internet. Then subjects took a quizwhere they completed
five multiple choice vocabulary questions. Subjects were told that each vo-
cabulary question they answered correctly was worth 20 points, with an
exchange rate of 10 points to 1 US dollar. After submitting their answers they
were told how many points they had earned ($10 maximum). In reality, we
fixed the number of points earned in each round (to either 100 or 80) to allow
across subject control in subsequent rounds. Such control is desirable both
because different earnings might have translated into substantial differences
in the amount of money taken, and because people maymake their decisions
in response to the amount taken, or the percentages taken. Thus, within any
given round, subjects earned the same amount, but we varied this amount
across rounds to ensure realism. Subjects were then forced to wait a small,
randomly determined period during which their partner ‘‘decided’’ whether
they would take 0%, 20%, or 80% of the money earned by the subject. In
reality, each subject was paired up with a computer that randomly chose to
take either 20% or 80%. Although deception is forbidden in many economic
laboratories, it remains a common and effective (often essential) methodol-
ogy in experimental psychology (37). In this case, we had to deceive subjects
because ethical considerations ruled out inflicting potential pain on subjects
by making them actually ingest hot sauce. Because we knew from previous
work that subjects respond differently to people than to computers, we
needed to deceive them about the true nature of their opponent (27). Our
subjects were told that their partners had also completed a similar vocabulary
task for money. Subjects then were shown a screen telling them the percent-
age taken by the other player and given the opportunity to behave aggres-
sively toward the other person who had just taken their earnings.
Subjects were told that they had been given a fixed endowment of 10 1/8
teaspoon doses of hot sauce. They could choose to force the other person to
drinkanamountof thehot sauce, or trade thehot sauce in formoney, at a rate
of 3 points per dose and 10 points to a dollar (i.e., they could keep a total of
$3 or use some or all of it to hurt their partner; they could not use their prior
earnings to buy or administer extra hot sauce). They were told that the other
person would have to drink the hot sauce to keep the money they took.
Otherwise, the stolen points were returned to the experimenters. In either
case, the subjectwould lose thepoints takenby their partner.We told subjects
their partner’s supposed rating of how much they liked the hot sauce. This
value was fixed for all subjects within a round to a low level (either 1, 2, or 3
of 10) of enjoyment (varied for realism). We found no difference in behavior
as a function of partner rating across rounds (SI Text Section S4).
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